VOTING TRANSPARENCY, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF CENTRAL BANKERS
We examine whether the publication of the individual voting records of central-bank council members is socially desirable when the preferences of the central bankers differ. We identify two positive effects of transparency. First, central bankers whose preferences differ from those of society may act in the interest of society in order to increase their re-appointment chances. Second, transparency enhances the efficiency of the appointment process since the government can align the preferences of the central-bank council with those of the public over time. In a monetary union, our findings about the desirability of transparency may be reversed. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Gersbach, Hans ; Hahn, Volker |
Published in: |
Economics and Politics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 16.2004, 11, p. 321-345
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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