Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit
Year of publication: |
2009-11-12
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Authors: | Corchon, Luis |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Endogenous Contests | Contest Success Function | Mixed-Strategies |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Source: |
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Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
Corchón, Luis, (2011)
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Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
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