Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Schlegel, Jan Christoph ; Mamageishvili, Akaki |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 124.2020, p. 62-81
|
Subject: | Matching | Constrained efficiency | Priority-based allocation | Pseudo-Market | Random assignments | Allokation | Allocation | Theorie | Theory | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
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