What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
In two-sided matching markets, stability can be costly. We define social welfare functions for matching markets and use them to formulate a definition of the price of stability. We then show that it is common to find a price tag attached to stability, and that the price of stability can be substantial. Therefore, when choosing a matching mechanism, a social planner would be well advised to weigh the price of stability against the value of stability, which varies from market to market.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Boudreau, James W. ; Knoblauch, Vicki |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 67.2014, C, p. 27-33
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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