What renders financial advisors less treacherous? : on commissions and reciprocity

by Vera Popova

An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission (paid by product providers) to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not, will a voluntary or obligatory payment by a client induce more truthful advice? According to the results, only the voluntary payment reduces the conflict of interest faced by advisors. -- financial advisors ; moral hazard ; reciprocity ; experiments

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Angelova, Vera
Publisher:	Jena : Univ. [u.a.]
Subject:	Anlageberatung \| Financial advisors \| Finanzdienstleistung \| Financial services \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Provision \| Commission payments \| Austauschtheorie \| Social exchange theory \| Experiment

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (34 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Jena economic research papers. - Jena : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1864-7057, ZDB-ID 2388825-8. - Vol. 2010,036
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Parallel als Druckausg. erschienen Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/36670 [Handle]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003980494