When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?

Tomoya Kazumura

Year of publication:	January, 2022
Authors:	Kazumura, Tomoya
Publisher:	Kyoto City, Japan : Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University
Subject:	Strategy-proofness \| efficiency \| non-quasi-linear preferences \| partially quasi-linear preferences \| generalized Vickrey rule \| maximal domain \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency \| Pareto-Optimum \| Pareto efficiency

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