When do auctions ensure the welfare-maximizing allocation of scare inputs?
John W. Mayo and David E. M. Sappington
| Year of publication: |
2016
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Mayo, John W. ; Sappington, David Edward Michael |
| Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 47.2016, 1, p. 186-206
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| Subject: | Preiswettbewerb | Price competition | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665292