When does predation dominate collusion?
Year of publication: |
March 2017
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Authors: | Wiseman, Thomas |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 85.2017, 2, p. 555-584
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Subject: | Dynamic games | collusion | exit | bankruptcy | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Insolvenz | Insolvency | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Kartell | Cartel | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Markteintritt | Market entry | Marktaustritt | Market exit | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Duopol | Duopoly |
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