When is a contrarian adviser optimal?

Robert Evans, Sönje Reiche

Year of publication:	[2022]
Authors:	Evans, Robert ; Reiche, Soenje
Publisher:	Cambridge : University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics
Subject:	Optimal Delegation \| Information Acquisition \| Evidence Disclosure \| Advice \| Groupthink \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Experten \| Experts \| Informationsversorgung \| Information provision \| Informationskosten \| Information costs \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Entscheidungstheorie \| Decision theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

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