Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent.
This paper characterizes incentive contracts for the situation where a principal is privately informed about the technology governing an agency relationship. In contrast to a standard principal-agent relationship, it is shown that a principal who values effort highly will choose to induce effort by paying a high base wage and low bonus payments. Moreover, the equilibrium contract has the principal transferring rents to the agent even though contracting possibilities are unrestricted and both principal and agent are risk neutral. Consequently, the informed-principal framework is shown to provide a rational for the payment of efficiency wages. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Year of publication: |
1994
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Authors: | Beaudry, Paul |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 35.1994, 4, p. 821-32
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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