Why can modern governments tax so much? : an agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries
Year of publication: |
April 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen ; Kreiner, Claus Thustrup ; Saez, Emmanuel |
Published in: |
Economica. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0013-0427, ZDB-ID 1800-4. - Vol. 83.2016, 330, p. 219-246
|
Subject: | Steuerrecht | Tax law | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Steuervermeidung | Tax avoidance | Finanzintermediation | Financial intermediation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Steuertheorie | Theory of taxation |
-
Ambiguity, audit errors, and tax compliance
Yoon, Sung-soo, (2011)
-
Taxation : critical perspectives on the world economy
James, Simon R., (2002)
-
Tax avoidance : in economics, law and public choice
Brooks, Michael Anthony, (1997)
- More ...
-
Why can modern governments tax So much? An agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, (2009)
-
Unwilling or unable to cheat? evidence from a randomized tax audit experiment in Denmark
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, (2010)
-
The optimal income taxation of couples as a multi-dimensional screening problem
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, (2007)
- More ...