Why CEO option compensation can be a bad option for shareholders : evidence from major customer relationships
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Liu, Claire ; Masulis, Ronald W. ; Stanfield, Jared |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 142.2021, 1, p. 453-481
|
Subject: | Compensation | Firm performance | Product market | Risk taking | Supply chain | Führungskräfte | Managers | Unternehmenserfolg | Lieferkette | Aktienoption | Stock option | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Beziehungsmarketing | Relationship marketing | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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