Why do Bank Boards have Risk Committees?
Year of publication: |
July 2021
|
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Authors: | Stulz, René M. ; Tompkins, James G. ; Williamson, Rohan ; Ye, Zhongxia |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (issuing body) |
Publisher: |
2021: Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Bank | Aufsichtsrat | Supervisory board | Prüfungsausschuss des Aufsichtsrats | Audit committee | Compliance-Management | Compliance management | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | USA | United States |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource illustrations (black and white) |
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Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w29106 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
Language: | English |
Notes: | System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Mode of access: World Wide Web Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w29106 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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