Why do firms allow their CEOs to join trade associations? : an embeddedness view
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Yen, Ju-Fang ; Chen, Yan-Shing ; Shen, Chung-hua ; Lin, Chih-Yung |
Published in: |
International review of economics & finance : IREF. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1059-0560, ZDB-ID 1137476-7. - Vol. 32.2014, p. 47-61
|
Subject: | CEO | Social networks | Trade associations | Bank loan contracts | Financial crisis | Führungskräfte | Managers | Soziales Netzwerk | Social network | Finanzkrise | Wirtschaftsverband | Business association | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance |
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