Why do governments default, and why don't they default more often?
Year of publication: |
2013-05
|
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Authors: | Buiter, Willem H. ; Rahbari, Ebrahim |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | fiscal sustainability | intertemporal budget constraint | political economy. | solvency | sovereign default | strategic default |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 9492 |
Classification: | E62 - Fiscal Policy; Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance; Taxation ; E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization ; F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems ; F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics ; G01 - Financial Crises ; G18 - Government Policy and Regulation ; H26 - Tax Evasion ; H63 - Debt; Debt Management |
Source: |
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Risk Assessment Under A Nonlinear Fiscal Policy Rule
Shiamptanis, Christos, (2014)
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Risk Assessment Under a Non-linear Fiscal Rule.
Shiamptanis, Christos, (2012)
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RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER A NONLINEAR FISCAL POLICY RULE
Shiamptanis, Cristos, (2014)
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Buiter, Willem H., (2012)
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The ECB as Lender of Last Resort for Sovereigns in the Euro Area
Buiter, Willem H., (2012)
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Why do governments default, and why don't they default more often?
Buiter, Willem H., (2013)
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