Why do managers under-delegate? : a co-productive principal-agent model

Guillaume Roels, Vladimir Smirnov, Ilia Tsetlin, Andrew Wait

Year of publication:	[2023] ; Revised version of 2021/36/TOM/DSC
Authors:	Roels, Guillaume ; Smirnov, Vladimir ; Tsetlin, Ilia ; Wait, Andrew
Publisher:	[Fontainebleau] : INSEAD
Subject:	principal-agent \| co-production \| teams \| double moral hazard \| contracting \| delegation \| entrepreneurship \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Arbeitsgruppe \| Team \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Entrepreneurship \| Entrepreneurship approach \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory

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