Why Government Bonds Are Sold by Auction and Corporate Bonds by Posted-Price Selling

This paper establishes the result that the seller prefers posted-price selling when the cost of information acquisition is high, and auctions when it is low. We view corporate bonds as an instance of the former case, and government bonds as an instance of the latter.

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Year of publication:	2003-03-01
Authors:	Habib, Michel A. ; Ziegler, Alexandre
Publisher:	International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering (FAME) <Genf>
Subject:	Transaktionskosten \| Staatsanleihe \| Informationskosten \| Auktionsbörse

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Extent:	37 p. application/pdf
Series:	International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering (FAME) - Research Paper Series FAME - Arbeitspapiere ; 78 (2003)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; Financial theory ; Information Economics ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005843439