Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Alesina, Alberto ; Tabellini, Guido Enrico |
Publisher: |
Munich : Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.] |
Subject: | Finanzpolitik | Fiscal policy | Konjunktur | Business cycle | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Korruption | Corruption | Theorie | Theory | OECD-Staaten | OECD countries | Entwicklungsländer | Developing countries |
Extent: | 28, [19] S Tab |
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Series: | CESifo working papers : the international platform of Ludwig-Maximilians University's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute. - Munich : CESifo, ISSN 1617-9595, ZDB-ID 2023380-2. - Vol. 1556 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Literaturverz. S. 26 - 28 |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?
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Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?
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