Why it pays to Conceal : on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information

Eberhard Feess, Markus Walzl

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Feess, Eberhard ; Walzl, Markus
Publisher:	Maastricht
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Informationsversorgung \| Information provision \| Zeit \| Time \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Theorie \| Theory

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