Why managers with low forecast precision select high disclosure intensity : an equilibrium analysis
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Gietzmann, Miles B. ; Ostaszewski, Adam |
Published in: |
Review of quantitative finance and accounting. - New York, NY : Springer, ISSN 0924-865X, ZDB-ID 1087855-5. - Vol. 43.2014, 1, p. 121-153
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Subject: | Voluntary disclosure | Disclosure strategy | Implied cost of capital | Endogeneous choice of information endowment | Omega ratio | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Kapitalkosten | Cost of capital | Theorie | Theory | Öffentlichkeitsarbeit | Public relations |
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