Why the NPV criterion does not maximize NPV
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Berkovitch, Elazar ; Israel, Ronen |
Published in: |
The review of financial studies. - Cary, NC : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0893-9454, ZDB-ID 1043666-2. - Vol. 17.2004, 1, p. 239-255
|
Subject: | Kapital | Capital | Allokation | Allocation | Betriebliche Investitionstheorie | Corporate investment theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory |
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