Why the rich are nastier than the poor : a note on optimal punishment
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Huck, Steffen ; Müller, Wieland |
Institutions: | Sonderforschungsbereich Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Berlin : Humboldt-Universität |
Subject: | Strafe | Punishment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Einkommensverteilung | Income distribution | Evolutionsökonomik | Evolutionary economics |
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