Why Would You Say that? The Effect of Adviser's Self-Interest on Credibility of Advice in Coordination Games
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Kuang, Xi (Jason) ; Dana, Jason D. ; Weber, Roberto A. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Experiment | Politikberatung | Policy advice | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Koordination | Coordination |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (35 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 14, 2003 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.425480 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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