Withholding of Information as an Endogenous Entry Barrier

In this paper, we analyze the withholding of information from an agent by a principal for fear that the agent may set up his own business if he is informed. We focus on two points when studying this question: the power of the principal to control the information available to the agent, and the possibility that the agent may set up a new firm if he receives private information.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	BARCENA-RUIZ, Juan Carlos ; RUBIO, Jesus
Published in:	Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 2000, 58, p. 185-194
Publisher:	École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE)

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065894