Workshop on "Economic Governance and Competition: The Pros and Cons of Private Ordering in the Shadow of the Law"
Topics (non-exclusive): - Under which conditions can private ordering replace public courts? What are the main benefits and the main costs associated with this substitution? - Should private institutions step in if the public court system fails? Who should set them up and who should pay for them? - What are the effects on private ordering if the quality of the legal system improves or decreases? What about the risk of crowding out? - How does the efficient private institution or organization that supports transactions depend on the characteristics of the transaction, the industry, or the country? - How can the efficiency of governance regimes be measured if both the market creation effect and the market shrinking effect that comes with private ordering are taken care of? - Can we formulate rules of thumb that help competiton authorities and courts to decide when the threat of collusion inherent in a self-governance mechanism outweighs its positive effects, or vice versa? - What can we learn from cases where private ordering is part of a regulated process, e.g. in industrial relations where trade unions are a substitute for labor courts, to some extent?
|Event dates:||2010-09-30 – 2010-10-01|
|Deadline Call for Papers:||2010-05-16|
|Organizer:||Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University|
Jens Prüfer (firstname.lastname@example.org)
|Classification:||G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance ; K2 - Regulation and Business Law|
|Event type:||Seminare, Summer Schools, Symposien, Workshops; Seminars, Summer Schools, Symposiums, Workshops|