contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …

contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …

In many organizational contexts, managers might have self-serving incentives whereby giving high evaluations to … employees comes at the expense of their own payoff. In this study, I examine the impact of managers’ self-serving incentives on … the collection and use of information for the purpose of subjective performance evaluation. I find that managers with self …

reasonably approximate real-life decision makers' behavior. Testing this theory with field data is difficult since typically …

contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …