Showing 1 - 10 of 13
We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable … effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583545
In many auctions, a good match between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties although …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490104
After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid offer. This paper seeks to determine what measures the seller should take to maximize his share of the surplus when bidders are privately informed about their risk of default. Special attention is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532158
In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532170
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008501955
I develop a model of contracting under reciprocal altruism accounting for some evidence which is paradoxical from the point of view of neoclassical models with selfish actors. My model predicts the crowding-out effect observed in the Trust Game with the possibility of a fine; for the Control Game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999184
Information flows are necessary for well-functioning financial markets. However, in many emerging markets, the legal and institutional preconditions for proper information flow are not met. How do such markets respond? We argue that they respond by developing innovative information transmission...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790077
We model how the choices by students to “rush” a fraternity, and the choices by a fraternity of whom to admit, interact with the signals that firms receive about student productivities to determine labor market outcomes. Both the fraternity and students care about future wages and fraternity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533557
In a market where sellers are heterogeneous with respect of the quality of their good and are more informed than buyers, high quality sellers' chances to trade might depend on their ability to inform buyers about the quality of the goods they offer. We study how the strength of competition among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040696
We consider a model of securities issues where the quality of securities is private information to the issuer, and firms of higher quality are more reluctant to issue securities than low quality firms. We show that, when the issuer directly trades with investors, market breakdown may occur. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040705