Seit der Einführung des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (Kodex) im Jahr 2002 sind deutsche börsennotierte Unternehmen zur Abgabe der Entsprechenserklärung gemäß § 161 AktG verpflichtet (Comply-or-Explain-Prinzip). Auf der Basis dieser Information soll durch den Druck des Kapitalmarkts...

This paper studies the short- and long-run announcement effects of declaring compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code (‘the Code’). We examine a unique, hand-collected data set of 317 German listed firms from 2002-2005. First, we present evidence from an analysis of firms’...

This paper studies the short-run announcement effects of compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code (‘the Code’) on firm value. Event study results suggest that firm value is unaffected by the announcement, although such market reactions to the first time disclosure of the...

Despite the relevance of credit financing for the profit and risk situation of commercial banks only little empirical evidence on the initial credit decision and monitoring process exists due to the lack of appropriate data on bank debt financing. The present paper provides a systematic overview...

Despite the relevance of credit financing for the profit and risk situation of commercial banks only little empirical evidence on the initial credit decision and monitoring process exists due to the lack of appropriate data on bank debt financing. The present paper provides a systematic overview...

Despite the relevance of credit financing for the profit and risk situation of commercial banks only little empirical evidence on the initial credit decision and monitoring process exists due to the lack of appropriate data on bank debt financing. The present paper provides a systematic overview...

Germany and the United States are generally seen as the two competing systems of corporate governance. In search for a comparative welfare analysis of the financial systems, we are interested in (i) the aggregate value-added of corporate investments in the two countries and in (ii) the...

We investigate the suggested substitutive relation between executive compensation and the disciplinary threat of takeover imposed by the market for corporate control. We complement other empirical studies on managerial compensation and corporate control mechanisms in three distinct ways. First,...