We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity,...

We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.

We investigate the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules. Although the literature has established their logical independence, we show, by presenting logical dependency results, that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would...

We characterize a rule for aggregating binary evaluations -- equivalently, dichotomous weak orders -- similar in spirit to the Borda rule from the preference aggregation literature. The binary evaluation framework was introduced as a general approach to aggregation by Wilson (J. Econ. Theory 10...

We characterize a rule for aggregating binary evaluations -- equivalently, dichotomous weak orders -- similar in spirit to the Borda rule from the preference aggregation literature. The binary evaluation framework was introduced as a general approach to aggregation by Wilson (J. Econ. Theory 10...