We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when...

This paper studies repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the play- ers are uncertain both about the payoff functions and about the relationship between the distribution of signals and the actions played. We introduce the concept of perfect public ex post equilibrium (PPXE), and...

In an irreducible stochastic game, no single player can prevent the stochastic process on states from being irreducible, so the other players can ensure that the current state has little effect on events in the distant future. This paper introduces stochastic games with imperfect public signals,...

This paper studies repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the players are uncertain both about the payoff functions and about the relationship between the distribution of signals and the actions played. We introduce the concept of perfect public ex post equilibrium (PPXE), and...

We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games with incomplete information where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions and the map from actions to signal distributions is itself unknown. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are...

One of the main problems impeding the evolution of cooperation is partner choice. When information is asymmetric (the quality of a potential partner is known only to himself), it may seem that partner choice is not possible without signaling. Many mutualisms, however, exist without signaling,...

This note characterizes the impact of adding rare stochastic mutations to an “imitation dynamic,†meaning a process with the properties that absent strategies remain absent, and non-homogeneous states are transient. The resulting system will spend almost all of its time at the...

We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in dou- ble auction markets with correlated, conditionally independent private values and many participants. The equilibrium we ï¬nd is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide...

We study repeated games with frequent actions and frequent imperfect public signals, where the signals are aggregates of many discrete events, such as sales or tasks. The high-frequency limit of the equilibrium set depends both on the probability law governing the discrete events and on how many...

We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...