Mechanisms that are used to characterize Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCC) have unattractive features since they have to cover every instances of the implementation problem. This is unavoidable, as there are infinitely many cases, but at the same time it leaves open whether...

Often preferences are such that any sensible goal must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design stipulates that in this case all alternatives must be equilibrium outcomes of the decision making mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is...

Implementation of a solution can be thought of as a way to design power distribution in a society such that for each admissible preference profile, the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes that the solution would select for it. By using the notion of a rights structure...

Rotation programs are widely used in societies. Some examples are job rotations, rotation schemes in the management of common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation of Pareto efficient social choice rules under...

Korpela [A Simple Sufficient Condition for Strong Implementation, J. Econ. Theory (2013), in press] derives a simple sufficient condition for strong implementation. Unfortunately, there are two errors in this paper: (1) the main theorem does not hold in the form it was presented and (2) it is...

In this paper, we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the core. The planner's exercise...

Rotation programs are widely used in societies. Some examples are job rotations, rotation schemes in the management of common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation of Pareto efficient social choice rules under...