A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let <InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"><![CDATA[${\cal L}_{C}$]]></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> (resp., <InlineEquation ID="Equ2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"><![CDATA[$\wp_{C})$]]></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation>

Given a set of outcomes that affect the welfare of the members of a group, K.J. Arrow imposed the following five conditions on the ordering of the outcomes as a function of the preferences of the individual group members, and then proved that the conditions are logically inconsistent:- The...

The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.

X is infinite and social preference is quasitransitive. Subset Y of X is sufficient for {x,y} if x and y can be socially ordered with individual preference information over Y alone. If there is an integer β such that every pair of alternatives has a sufficient set with at most β members then...

type="main" xml:lang="en" <p>When an individual’s reported preference scheme makes a difference to the selection of a policy, that individual’s report imposes a cost on the rest of society because the selected policy would have been different had the individual’s reported preference been...</p>