Despite the fact that childbearing is time-consuming (i.e. associated with a negative resource effect), we descriptively find female researchers with children in business and economics to be more productive than female researchers without children. Hence, female researchers with children either...

The under-representation of women on boards is a heavily discussed topic—not only in Germany. Based on critical mass theory and with the help of a hand-collected panel dataset of 151 listed German firms for the years 2000–2005, we explore whether the link between gender diversity and firm...

This study seeks to understand the relation between firm size and supervisory board composition. Specifically, we ask if and how firm size influences occupational and international background diversity in supervisory boards. Relying on resource dependence theory and theories of organizational...

Das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes verpflichtet den Gesetzgeber, bis Ende 2005 eine neue Regelung zur Finanzierung der Lohnersatzleistungen während des Mutterschutzes zu erlassen. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat in seinem Urteil zwar offen gelassen, welche Finanzierungsvariante der...

In our paper, we view academia from a personnel economics perspective and analyze three important questions: (1) Who decides to become a researcher and what are the mechanisms of selection and self-selection that drive this process? (2) What makes re-searchers stay motivated and how can they be...

In diesem Beitrag werden die Determinanten der Inanspruchnahme von Elternzeit durch Väter in Deutschland untersucht. Zwar stieg der Anteil der Väter in Elternzeit seit der Elterngeldreform im Jahr 2007 kontinuierlich an, doch stellen Väter immer noch die Minderheit der...

In light of the trend towards the Anglo-Saxon model of structured PhD education we analyze whether the positive relation between supervisor research productivity and young researcher productivity does persist in research groups where several PhD and postdoctoral students are supervised by a team...

In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously...