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Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 239-326). 2015

This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions”) deliberately get together to jointly determine within-group actions, while interacting noncooperatively across groups. The chapter describes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025454

Multilateral matching

Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke - In: Journal of Economic Theory 156 (2015) C, pp. 175-206

We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows … us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the … equilibria exist, correspond to stable outcomes, and yield core outcomes. Competitive equilibria exist in our setting even when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189755

Chapter 16. Formation of Networks and Coalitions

Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 729-779). 2011

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also covers models of group and network formation by farsighted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025687

Profit-maximizing matchmaker

Ko, Chiu Yu; Konishi, Hideo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 217-232

This paper considers a resource allocation mechanism that utilizes a profit-maximizing auctioneer/matchmaker in the Kelso–Crawford (1982) (many-to-one) assignment problem. We consider general and simple (individualized price) message spaces for firmsʼ reports following Milgrom (2010). We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049796

Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games

Newton, Jonathan - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1, pp. 364-381

An evolutionary style model of recontracting is given which guarantees convergence to core allocations of an underlying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010582585

Coalition Formation

Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - Elsevier

This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (â€œcoalitionsâ€) deliberately get together to jointly determine within-group actions, while interacting noncooperatively across groups. The chapter...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255412

Chapter 55 Values of non-transferable utility games

McLean, Richard P. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2077-2120). 2002

This chapter surveys a class of solution concepts for n -person games without transferable utility — NTU games for short — that are based on varying notions of “fair division”. An NTU game is a specification of payoffs attainable by members of each coalition through some joint course of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024490

A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems

Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 1-27

This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263593

Group robust stability in matching markets

Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 394-398

misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049837

Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand

Kojima, Fuhito - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 1-14

We study resource allocation with multi-unit demand, such as the allocation of courses to students. In contrast to the case of single-unit demand, no stable mechanism, not even the (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm, achieves desirable properties: it is not strategy-proof and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719484