We propose a methodology that is generalizable to a broad class of repeated games in order to facilitate operability of belief-learning models with repeated-game strategies. The methodology consists of (1) a generalized repeated-game strategy space, (2) a mapping between histories and...

One of the fundamental problems in both economics and organization is to understand how individuals coordinate. The widely used minimum-effort coordination game has served as a simplified model to better understand this problem. This paper first presents theoretical results that give conditions...

Online publishers sell opportunities to show ads. Some advertisers pay only if their ad elicits a user response. Publishers estimate response rates for ads in order to estimate expected revenues from showing the ads. Then publishers select ads that maximize estimated expected revenue.

We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm - that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on...

Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject’s position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis.