The literature on partnership dissolution generally takes the dissolution decision as given and examines whether the outcome is efficient. A well-known result is that <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$k+1$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mi>k</mi> <mo>+</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-price auctions dissolve a partnership efficiently when the share structure is sufficiently close to equal....</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

This contribution revisits the problem of allocating R&D subsidies by government agencies. Typically, the applicants’ financial constraints are private information. The literature has recommended the use of auctions in order to reduce information rents and thus improve the efficiency of how...

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer’s problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer’s objective...

We study an inside patent holder's optimal licensing policy when it has imperfect information about the value of the patent to its rival. The patent holder can choose any two-part licensing fee with either per unit or ad valorem royalties. We demonstrate that the equilibrium will be either a...

Anton and Yao (1989) show that in split-award procurement auctions bidders coordinate their bids to sustain high buyer price. We relax their assumption that the buyer has full information about the suppliers’ production costs and restore the coordination outcome.

This paper studies procurement contracts where a buyer can either divide full production among multiple suppliers or award the entire production to a single supplier. We examine the effect of using multiple suppliers on investment incentives. In a framework of generalized second-price auctions...