We answer here to François Allisson?s and Nicolas Brisset?s comment on our article « Approval Voting, Evaluation Voting : An Experiment during the 2012 French Presidential Election » published in 2013 in the Revue économique (n?64). We develop five arguments which enable to qualify their...

We study the impact of a minimum wage in a segmented labor market in which workers are at different stages of their careers. At the end of a learning-by-doing period, workers paid the minimum wage quit “bad jobs” for better-paying “good jobs”, following an on-the-job search process with...

During the first round of the French Presidential election of April 22nd, 2012, voters of three French municipalities were invited to test approval voting and three types of evaluation voting. This paper presents the main results of that experiment. After correction of the participation and...

In a matching model in which the job destruction rate and the output are endogenous, we show that the presence of a binding minimum wage prompts firms to choose too risky jobs. Introducing layoff taxes therefore reduces unemployment and improves market efficiency.

According to some authors, technical change contributes to the explanation of the increase in equilibrium unemployment by making jobs more and more specialized. Here, we assume that firms optimally adapt the specialization of jobs to overall labour market conditions. Using a matching labour...

Using a simple extension of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we show that substituting layoff taxes for payroll taxes reduces unemployment. Indeed, layoff taxes lead the firms to internalize the effect of dismissals on unemployment costs. So countries which have costly employment protection...

Using a circular matching model (Marimon R, Zilibotti F. Unemployment vs. mismatch of talents: Reconsidering unemployment benefits. Economic Journal 1999;109; 266-291), where the wage setting is similar to Weiss (Weiss A. Job queues and layoffs in labor markets with flexible wages. Journal of Political...