The natural projection plays a fundamental role to understand the behavior of the Walrasian economies. In this paper, we extend this method to analyze the behavior of infinite dimensional economies. We introduce the definition of the social equilibrium set, and we show that there exists a...

One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior.

Abstract The economy under study is populated by two types of firms (innovative and not) and two types of workers (skilled and unskilled). The aim is to develop a model that confirms the existence of complementarities between innovative firms (R&D activities) and skilled workers (human capital)...

We consider an economy with two types of firms (innovative and non-innovative) and two types of workers (skilled and unskilled), where workers' decisions are driven by imitative behavior, and thus the evolution of such an economy depends on the initial distribution of the firms. We show that...