The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that people's beliefs over uncertain events might not be representable by subjective probability. We show that if a risk averse decision maker, who has a well defined Bayesian prior, perceives an Ellsberg type decision problem as possibly composed of a bundle of...

We characterize a monotonic core solution defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core solutions for veto balanced games and we show that, in general,...

<Para ID="Par1">We introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games: The Surplus Distributor Prenucleolus. The new solution is a lexicographic value although it is not a weighted prenucleolus. The SD-prenucleolus satisfies core stability, strong aggregate monotonicity, null player out property in...</para>

The paper presents a framework in which the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. None of the main results is original.