Insiders can artificially deflect the market prices of financial instruments from their full-information or inside value' by issuing deceptive accounting reports. Incentive support for disinformational activity comes through forms of compensation that allow corporate insiders to profit...

We study financial reporting and corporate governance in 218 companies accused of price fixing. These firms engage in evasive financial reporting strategies, including earnings smoothing, segment reclassification, and restatements. In corporate governance, cartel firms favor outside directors...

In 2012, the Office of Anticorruption and Integrity (OAI) responded to allegations of fraud and corruption; proactively reviewed projects of the Asian Development Bank (ADB); provided integrity due diligence support; and informed and empowered staff, civil society, and the private sector with...

We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a...

L’étude du remplacement du dirigeant emblématique de l’entreprise Carrefour, au début de l’année 2005, permet d’illustrer le rôle disciplinaire joué par les analystes financiers, ainsi que les effets pervers résultant de la pression exercée par ces derniers sur la qualité des...

(VF)Cet article s’appuie sur les travaux académiques des dix dernières années pour évaluer les effets de la réglementation française visant à accroître l’indépendance des auditeurs. Pour les sociétés cotées en bourse, l’obligation de recourir à deux auditeurs se solde...

(VF)Dans cet article, nous avançons que les dirigeants, soucieux de maximiser la richesse des actionnaires, manipulent l'information comptable afin de transférer de la richesse de certaines parties prenantes vers les actionnaires. En particulier, la divulgation d'une image de situation...