Showing 1 - 10 of 128
consistent with the theoretical results: in the experiment, investment levels with and without legal protection are comparable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083356
Recent tests for the convergence hypothesis derive from regressing average growth rates on initial levels: a negative initial level coefficient is interpreted as convergence. These tests turn out to be plagued by Francis Galton's classical fallacy of regression towards the mean. Using a dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791236
This paper develops a theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all … dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria that are all regular. These …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497794
is lost under imperfect monitoring, and (ii) with learning, collusion unravels with low or high flexibility, but not with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084106
I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I derive optimal equilibria and consider a series of comparative statistics and extensions.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666417
Collusive agreements and relational contracts are commonly modeled as equilibria of dynamic games with the strategic … cooperation is supportable in equilibrium. Our results apply to other games sharing the strategic structure of the Prisoner …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666887
Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. Many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789197
We model cooperation between an employer and a workers' union as an equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game with discounting and imperfect monitoring. The employer has private information about firm profitability. The model explains the incidence and duration of strikes, as well as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791411
Leniency programmes (or policies) reduce sanctions against cartel members that self-report to the Antitrust Authority. We focus on their ability to directly deter cartels and analogous criminal organizations by undermining internal trust, increasing individual incentives to ‘cheat’ on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136696
An agent can choose to forego benefits from side opportunities and to instead provide benefits to the principal. In return, the principal offers rewards. If this exchange is not contractible, typically repeated interaction will be required to sustain it. This model allows the agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002384