market competition on the performance-pay sensitivity of CEOs, and contrast it with the effect for department managers and … reform, decreased the sensitivity of pay to performance of CEOs, with no significant effects found for other managers or …

particular, branches with more experienced managers were better able to respond to the new incentives. …

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …

managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on ‘income smoothing … termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts’ duration. When managers have …

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

-out perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare-maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers …