Similar Search Results

Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530386

Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms

Friebel, Guido; Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study the effect of earnings manipulation on incentives within the corporate hierarchy. When top management manipulates earnings, it must prevent information leakage from corporate insiders to the outside world. If an insider (e.g. a division manager) gains evidence about earnings...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504644

Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms

Friebel, Guido; Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504726

Can we Automate Earnings Forecasts and Beat Analysts?

Ball, Ryan; Ghysels, Eric; Zhou, Huan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Can we design statistical models to predict corporate earnings which either perform as well as, or even better than analysts? If we can, then we might consider automating the process, and notably apply it to small and international firms which typically have either sparse or no analyst coverage....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084355

Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?

Bruno, Valentina; Claessens, Stijn - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

For a large number of companies from different countries, we analyze how company corporate governance practices and country regulatory regimes interact in terms of company valuation. We confirm that corporate governance plays a crucial role in efficient company monitoring and shareholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504236

Rhineland exit?

Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

of firm- specific risks. Whereas globalisation has increased firm-specific risk by intensifying competition …, globalisation of capital markets has also greatly increased the scope for diversification of firm-specific risk. Diversification of … this risk on the capital market is an efficient form of social insurance. Reducing the claims of workers on the surplus of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504292

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment

Cespa, Giovanni; Cestone, Giacinta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become an effective entrenchment strategy for inefficient CEOs. We thus argue that managerial turnover and firm value are increased by the institutionalization of stakeholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504332

A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Hochberg, Yael; Sapienza, Paola; Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behaviour of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favour of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504338

Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers

Cornelli, Francesca; Li, David Daokui - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

The paper studies the role of risk arbitrage in takeover contests. We show that arbitrageurs have an incentive to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504384

Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives

Dow, James; Raposo, Clara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

In this Paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the CEO in the formulation of corporate strategy. We allow the agent (CEO) to play a role in defining the parameters of the agency problem, in an incomplete contracting model in which the agent can be rewarded based only on financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504388