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Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We study a labour market in which firms can observe workers’ output but not their effort, and in which a worker’s productivity in a given firm depends on a worker-firm specific component, unobservable for the firm. Firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs. As...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791700

Working-Time Regulation, Firm Heterogeneity, and Efficiency

Ortega, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

of a legal workweek may enhance efficiency with respect to laissez-faire: while laissez-faire is good at allocating hours …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792262

Performance Pay and Adverse Selection

Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

It is well known in personnel economics that firms may improve the quality of their workforce by offering performance pay. We analyse an equilibrium model where worker productivity is private information and show that the gains to the firms from worker self-selection may not be matched by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123693

Financial Frictions, Investment, and Institutions

Claessens, Stijn; Ueda, Kenichi; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

frictions using a canonical investment model. We consider two channels by which frictions affect investment: (i) through … frictions, institutions affect investment. We find that improved corporate governance (e.g., less severe informational problems …) and enhanced contractual enforcement reduce financial frictions affecting investment, while stronger creditor rights (e …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784722

The Internal Governance of Firms

Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance in improving efficiency. Interestingly, this leads us to a … theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207

Publish or Perish? Incentives and Careers in Italian Academia

Checchi, Daniele; De Fraja, Gianni; Verzillo, Stefano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We derive a theoretical model of effort in the presence of career concern based on the multi-unit all-pay auction, and closely inspired by the Italian academic market. In this model, the number of applicants, the number of new posts, and the relative importance of the determinants of promotion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083915

Herding cats? Management and university performance

McCormack, John; Propper, Carol; Smith, Sarah L. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Using a tried and tested measure of management practices which has been shown to predict firm performance, we survey nearly 250 departments across 100+ UK universities. We find large differences in management scores across universities and that departments in older, research-intensive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084536

Coworkers, Networks, and Job Search Outcomes

Saygin, Perihan; Weber, Andrea; Weynandt, Michèle A. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Social networks are an important channel of information transmission in the labor market. This paper studies the mechanisms by which social networks have an impact on labor market outcomes of displaced workers. We base our analysis on administrative records for the universe of private sector...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084542

Why Do Worker-Firm Matches Dissolve?

Gielen, Anne; Ours, Jan C van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

In a dynamic labor market worker-firm matches dissolve frequently causing workers to separate and firms to look for replacements. A separation may be initiated by the worker (a quit) or the firm (a layoff), or may result from a joint decision. A dissolution of a worker-firm match may be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789184

Relational contracts when the agent's productivity inside the relationship is correlated with outside opportunities

Wagner, Alexander F - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

An agent can choose to forego benefits from side opportunities and to instead provide benefits to the principal. In return, the principal offers rewards. If this exchange is not contractible, typically repeated interaction will be required to sustain it. This model allows the agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002384