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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of … compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most … perfect competition, the resulting efficiency loss can be larger than that imposed by a single firm or principal, who distorts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769

Harnessing Success: Determinants of University Technology Licensing Performance

Belenzon, Sharon; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study the impact of incentive pay, local development objectives and government constraints on university licensing performance. We develop and test a simple contracting model of technology licensing offices, using new survey information together with panel data on U.S. universities for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667018

Performance Pay and the Gender Wage Gap: Evidence from Spain

de la Rica, Sara; Dolado, Juan J.; Vegas, Raquel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper uses detailed information from a large wage survey in 2006 to analyze the gender wage gap in the performance-pay (PP) component of total hourly wages and its contribution to the overall gender gap in Spain. Under the assumption that PP is determined in a more competitive fashion than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554226

Returns to Inventors

Toivanen, Otto; Väänänen, Lotta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

A key input to inventive activity is human capital. Hence it is important to understand the monetary incentives of inventors. We estimate the effect of patented inventions on individual earnings by linking data on U.S. patents and their inventors to Finnish employer-employee data. Returns are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530342

Performance Pay and Adverse Selection

Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

It is well known in personnel economics that firms may improve the quality of their workforce by offering performance pay. We analyse an equilibrium model where worker productivity is private information and show that the gains to the firms from worker self-selection may not be matched by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123693

Performance Incentives with Award Constraints

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper studies the provision of incentives in a large US training organization, which is divided into about 50 independent pools of training agencies. The number and the size of the agencies within each pool vary greatly. Each pool distributes performance incentive awards to the training...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661877

A General Test of Gaming

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

An important lesson from the incentive literature is that explicit incentives may elicit dysfunctional and unintended responses, also known as gaming responses. The existence of these responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behaviour is typically hidden from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114434

Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives

Dow, James; Raposo, Clara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

In this Paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the CEO in the formulation of corporate strategy. We allow the agent (CEO) to play a role in defining the parameters of the agency problem, in an incomplete contracting model in which the agent can be rewarded based only on financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504388

The Internal Governance of Firms

Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights are reflected by the behavior of subjects in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433