It is believed that market power of the input supplier, charging a linear price, is detrimental for the consumers since it creates the double marginalisation problem. We show that this view may not be true if the final goods producers can adopt strategies to reduce rent extraction by the input...

We study the implication of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank financed Cournot duopoly when firms face an imperfect credit market. We consider two situations without or with credit rationing. When there is no credit rationing moderately higher cost...

We show that the presence of a strategic tax policy increases the incentive for a horizontal merger compared to the situation with no tax policy. Thus, we point towards a new factor, viz., strategic tax policy, for increasing the incentive for a horizontal merger that has been ignored in the...

We show the effects of the bargaining power of labour unions on product innovation under decentralised and centralised wage bargaining. In this context, we show the implications of preference function, which affects the market size. A higher union bargaining power increases innovation if...

It is usually believed that higher competition, implying more active firms, benefits consumers. We show that this may not be the case in an industry with asymmetric cost firms. A rise in the number of more cost inefficient firms makes the consumers worse-off in the presence of a welfare...

This paper introduces "harassment" in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers with all possible levels of income participate in such an equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment cost as such may not affect tax revenue....