In this paper we review the state of the art of Games with Strategic Complementarities (GSC), which are fundamental tools in modern Industrial Organization. The originality of the paper lies in the way the material is presented. Indeed, the mathematical aspects of GSC are complex and scattered...

In this paper we extend the basic model of Cournot competition to the case where both the demand function and the cost functions of each firm depend on the amounts produced by competitors. In this modified setting, proving existence of equilibria becomes harder. We develop a generalization of...

The intuitive idea of two activities being complements, for example tea and lemon, is that increasing the level of one makes somehow desirable to increase the level of the other (Samuelson, 1974). Hence complementarity, in its very nature, is a sensitivity property of the set of solutions to an...

We comment on the relation between models of information based on signals/partitions, and those based on sigma-algebras. We show that more informative signals need not generate finer sigma-algebras, hence that Blackwell's theorem fails if information is modeled as sigma-algebras. The reason is...

We introduce a class of games with complementarities that has the quasisupermodular games, hence the supermodular games, as a special case. Our games retain the main property of quasisupermodular games: the Nash set is a nonempty complete lattice. We use monotonicity properties on the best reply...

We show that the main theorem in Al-Najjar’s 1995 Econometrica paper is false. We provide additional references for the residual implications that are valid, but point out that these stan- dard implications are incapable of bearing the interpretative weight that Al-Najjar places on them.

The organization of supply relations varies across industries. This paper builds a theoretical framework to compare three alternative supply structures: vertical integration, networks, and markets. The analysis considers the relationship between uncertainty in demand for specific inputs,...

The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non-trivial forms of unawareness (Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini, 1998). We introduce a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge...

In perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and a formulation with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over in a particular...

We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a sequence of players receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects all players' preferences over present...