We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status quo. We show that it is optimal to publicly disclose...

This paper focuses on the role of managerial agency costs in financial conglomeration. We model conglomeration as the integration of commercial and investment banking in one organizational unit where bank managers accomplish both activities. We assume that managers differ in their abilities to...

This paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending. We show that, when social ties in a community enhance borrowers' incentives to exert effort, a profit-maximizing financier chooses a group of limited size. Borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have...

The aim of this paper is to study what is the best structure of a Board of Directors when collusive aspects between the Board and the CEO are taken into account. We analyze how shareholders should select the members of the Board in a framework with asymmetric information and uncertainty about...

In most Initial Public Offerings (IPO) in the world, the underwriter selects syndicate members and uses the information of their investors' clientele to set the offering price. The objective of this paper is to develop a model of the "book building" process in which the formation of the...

In this paper, we develop a model of a decision maker using an expert to obtain information. The expert is biased toward some favoured decision but cares also about its reputation on the market for experts. We then analyse the corresponding decision game depending on the nature of the...