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Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students

Montmarquette, Claude; Rullière, Jean-Louis; Villeval, … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100880

Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company

Montmarquette, Claude; Rullière, Jean-Louis; Villeval, … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers originating from companies with different incentives and working habits. In this paper, we offer a new way to investigate the relationship between executive pay and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101013

The Structure of Incentives in a Major Information Systems Outsourcing Contract: The Case of a North American Public Organization

Aubert, Benoit A.; Patry, Michel; Rivard, Suzanne - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1995

We use agency theory to shed light on a complex, multi-year outsourcing contract between an important public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100666

Assessing the Risk of IT Outsourcing

Aubert, Benoit A.; Patry, Michel; Rivard, Suzanne - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1998

Outsourcing decisions, and contractual arrangements of the type required by an IT outsourcing deal, entail risks. This is not to say that outsourcing is bad in itself. It only means that, as in other risky business ventures such as new product development, capital investments, and IS projects,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100770

Managing the Risk of IT Outsourcing

Aubert, Benoit A.; Dussault, Sylvie; Patry, Michel; … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1998

While it can bring several benefits, IT outsourcing entails some risks. As it is the case in other types of investments or business ventures, the risk associated to an IT outsourcing project must be evaluated and managed. This paper proposes a framework for the management of IT outsourcing risk,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100983

Contracting under Ex Post Moral Hazard and Non-Commitment

Boyer, M. Martin - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

This paper characterizes the optimal insurance contract in an environment where an informed agent can misrepresent the …), the optimal contract is such that higher losses are over-compensated while lower losses are on average under …-compensated. The amount by which higher losses are over-compensated decreases as the loss increases. The optimal contract may then be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101113

Organizational Redesign, Information Technologies and Workplace Productivity

Dostie, Benoit; Jayaraman, Rajshri - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2008

Using a large longitudinal, nationally representative workplace-level dataset, we explore the productivity gains associated with computer use and organizational redesign. The empirical strategy involves the estimation of a production function, augmented to account for technology use and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100694

Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence

Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011

In this paper, we investigate individuals' investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their relative position in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833344

Existence and Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: A Contraction Mapping Approach

Long, Ngo Van; Soubeyran, Antoine - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1999

We provide sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium. The contraction mapping approach is used. Equilibrium is characterized in terms of marginal costs. The result is useful for applications to two-stage games, where, in the first stage, firms incur costs to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100660

Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating

Long, Ngo Van; Soubeyran, Antoine - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1999

This paper analyzes a class of two-stage Cournot games where rival firms, in the first stage, incur real resource costs in jointly manipulating their marginal costs of production, so as to influence the outcome of game they want to play in the second stage. Marginal costs may be manipulated by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100697