In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable...

We present a new extension of the Shapley value for games with communication structure,only pairwise meetings can occur when some of them are not permitted.The present extension is a new one and in particular it is di .erent from the Myerson value,from the position value,and from a previous...

This paper presents two new axiomatizations of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Two associated games are defined and a consistency axiom is required. The construction of the associated games presupposes that coalitions behave in an aggressive manner towards players who are not...

The aim of this paper is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game...

This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy...

In this paper, we estimate a collective model of household labour supply à la Chiappori on British two-earner couples, using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We find that family members do not pool their resources: the unitary model is rejected. We estimate a sharing rule...

In this work, a new axiomatization of the Shapley value is presented. An associated game is constructed which can also be interpreted as a perturbation of the original game. We define a sequence of games, when the term of order n, in this sequence, is the associated game of the term of order (n-1).

The aim of this paper is to present an approach to the middleman problem in the context of cooperative games when communication between players is graph-restricted. We consider a set of three axioms: linearity, dummy player and independence of non connected coalitions. These axioms are generally...